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INTRODUCTION
Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") bar employment
discrimination lawsuits against churches?' Last year a divided panel of the
Second Circuit answered "yes" to that question in Hankins v. Lyght,2 but the
Seventh Circuit disagreed; its opinion in Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria
called Hankins "unsound."3
This Comment defends Hankins. Part I explains how the RFRA defense
applies to private plaintiffs. Part II builds on the work of Professor Douglas
Laycock to argue that employment decisions are an exercise of religion. Part
III rebuts Tomic's attack on Hankins by showing that the RFRA defense is
broader than the constitutionally based "ministerial exception" to anti-
discrimination laws.
Congress passed the RFRA to undo the Supreme Court's work in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith.' In Smith, the Court held that states may apply
neutral, generally applicable laws to the faithful without accommodating
their religious needs. In passing the RFRA, Congress found that Smith did
not do enough to protect religion because "laws 'neutral' toward religion
J.D., Yale Law School, 2007. My thanks to Julianna Bentes for her helpful
edits.
1. The RFRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20oobb to 20oobb- 4 (2000). By "em-
ployment discrimination lawsuits," I mean suits brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 20ooe-16c
(20oo), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
2. 441 F.3d 96, io6 (2d Cir. 20o6).
3. 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
4. 494 U.S. 872, 881 (199o). For an account of the RFRA's legislative history, see
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1994).
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may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise."' Though the federal anti-discrimination laws are facially
neutral, they nonetheless burden religious exercise by impairing churches'
ability to shape their characters and beliefs.
I. How DOES THE RFRA DEFENSE APPLY TO PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS?
Congress intended the RFRA to "provide a... defense" to "persons,"6
including churches,7 whose "religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government."' Once a church shows that the government has substantially
burdened its religious exercise, then the government's action may only be
upheld if the government's interest is compelling and the means chosen to
achieve that interest are the least restrictive available.9
The Hankins majority held that the RFRA's text indicates that Congress
intended the defense to apply to lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs. °
That textual argument is convincing-indeed, there are other textual clues,
besides those mentioned by the majority, that support this reading."
But the majority's textual analysis does not address the dissent's practi-
cal objection: How can a private plaintiff produce evidence of the govern-
ment's interest in preventing discrimination? 2 We expect plaintiffs to prove
their employers' discriminatory intent, but we don't expect them to show
that the anti-discrimination laws are narrowly tailored to achieve a compel-
5. 42 U.S.C. § 20oobb(a)(2).
6. Id. § 2000bb(b)(2).
7. See i U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (defining "person" to include "associations" and "so-
cieties"); see also Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT.
L. REV. 145, 151-52 (1995) (gathering evidence from the congressional debates
over the RFRA to conclude that the Act protects "institutional free exercise").
8. 42 U.S.C. § 20oobb(b)(2).
9. Id. § 200obb-1(a)-(b).
10. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
11. The Hankins majority might also have pointed out that Congress intended the
RFRA to apply not only to "all federal law" but also to "the implementation of
that law." 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb-3(a) (emphasis added). Every discrimination
lawsuit is an "implementation" of the federal anti-discrimination laws. The
majority also might have noted that the RFRA implicitly includes the federal
courts in its definition of "government": "a branch, department, agency, in-
strumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the
United States." Id. § 20oobb-2(1). Thus, when a court grants a private litigant
relief under the anti-discrimination laws, that grant is an act of "government"
and covered by the RFRA.
12. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 114-15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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ling governmental interest. Only the government has the authority and the
resources to argue these points.
The dissent's objection is misplaced because the government has no
compelling interest in a private employment dispute. Therefore, even if
private plaintiffs did have the government's authority and resources, those
advantages wouldn't make any difference-plaintiffs can't win this argu-
ment.
The government's interest is limited to the particular exercise of religion
at issue, as the Court made clear in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal. 3 There, a church asked for an exemption from the Con-
trolled Substances Act so that its members could import huasca, a narcotic
used in its ceremonies. Opposing that request, the Attorney General stressed
the government's interest in the "uniform application" of the drug laws-
that is, its interest in keeping all narcotics away from all citizens.' 4 A unani-
mous Court rejected that interpretation in favor of a "more focused" in-
quiry: "RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling
interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the
person'-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened."'" Centro Espirita shows that the government's in-
terest in an employment discrimination lawsuit is not its interest in elimi-
nating discrimination from all workplaces, but instead its interest in "the
particular claimant"-that is, its interest in preventing the particular reli-
gious employer from making a particular kind of employment decision.
However compelling the government's global interest in banning dis-
crimination from all workplaces, its specific interest in how one particular
church fills a vacancy is not compelling. Ugly and hurtful though discrimi-
nation is, the government's interest in preventing one instance of it is less
than Wisconsin's interest in seeing to it that its Amish teens receive an edu-
cation-an interest found not to be compelling in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 6 Nor
is the government's interest in a single employer more compelling than
Indiana's interest in preventing fraud in unemployment claims-an interest
found not to be compelling in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employ-
ment Security Division.7 Nor is the government's interest in preventing a
church from discriminating greater than its interest in preventing that
church's members from overdosing-an interest found not to be compel-
ling in Centro Espirita. If none of those interests are compelling, then the
13. 546 U.S. 418, 429 (20o6).
14. Id. at 423.
15. Id. at 430-31.
16. 406 U.S. 205, 223-27 (1972).
17. 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981).
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government's interest in the outcome of one church's hiring process isn't
compelling, either.
The Court once described "the State's. .. interest in eliminating dis-
crimination against women" as "compelling."'"R But the interest at stake in
that case was California's global interest in preventing discrimination in all
its workplaces, and therefore isn't relevant to the RFRA defense. If the RFRA
required courts to consider the global interests served by the anti-
discrimination laws, then Centro Espirita would have considered the gov-
ernment's interest in preventing drug abuse by every citizen. The Court
didn't do that; instead, it considered only the interest in preventing church
members from worshipping with huasca.
The RFRA defense to an employment discrimination lawsuit collapses
into one question: Do the discrimination laws substantially burden the de-
fendant's exercise of religion? The answer to that question is well within
private plaintiffs' power of proof. It therefore is not unfair for a church to
raise the RFRA defense to an employee's discrimination lawsuit, and the
Hankins dissent's objections are misplaced.
II. How Do THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS "BURDEN" THE "EXERCISE
OF RELIGION"?
The RFRA defines "exercise of religion" broadly, to include "any" exer-
cise, whether or not the exercise is "central" to a system of religious belief. 9
Every personnel decision by a religious institution is an exercise of religion,
and a lawsuit challenging such a decision substantially burdens the institu-
tion's religious exercise.
A church is more than a troupe that performs sacred rites. The secretary
who answers the rabbi's phones and the custodian who locks up at night are
as much a part of the synagogue as the rabbi. The people whom a church
hires determine the church's present character and shape its future devel-
opment. This is the lesson Professor Douglas Laycock draws from the Su-
preme Court's decisions on church labor disputes: "When the state inter-
feres with the allocation of influence and authority within a church, it inter-
feres with the very process of forming the religion as it will exist in the fu-
ture."20
18. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 200obb-2( 4 ) (2000).
20. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1373, 1391 (1981) (noting that the Supreme Court has been willing to ex-
tend the "right of church autonomy as far as necessary to include the cases be-
fore it").
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Justice Brennan adopted Laycock's reasoning in his concurring opinion
in Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos."' That decision upheld as constitutional section 702 of Title
VII, a provision that permits church employers to discriminate against other
faiths.22 Citing Laycock, Justice Brennan noted that a religious community is
"an organic entity" that is "not reducible to a mere aggregation of individu-
als."23 The community's choice of whom to hire is an important means by
which the community "defines itself. '24 The courts should be "solicit[ous]"
of those choices because "furtherance of the autonomy of religious organi-
zations often furthers individual religious freedom as well."
25
Every discrimination lawsuit-whatever the type of discrimination al-
leged-interferes with the allocation of influence and authority within the
"organic entity" of the church and thereby substantially burdens religious
exercise. Such regulation affects the character of the church today and thus
the content of its members' beliefs tomorrow.
Yet the RFRA defense is not available to every employer affiliated with
religion; it is available only to an institution with religion at its very core. If,
for instance, a church owns a bank, that bank's employment decisions
should be regulated just like those of every other bank. A bank isn't a reli-
gious institution, and having a church as a majority shareholder doesn't
make it one. By regulating a bank's personnel decisions, the government
doesn't impinge on the autonomy of an institution that articulates religious
beliefs.
Federal courts have experience distinguishing truly religious institutions
from church-owned businesses. Section 702 of Title VII allows a religious
institution to discriminate against other faiths; to qualify for the exemption,
an organization must prove that it is, in fact, religious-that it is more simi-
lar to a church than to a church-owned bank. The courts apply section 702
carefully. Before giving an employer the benefit of the section 702 exemp-
tion, a court will "weigh[]" "all significant religious and secular characteris-
tics... to determine whether the corporation's purpose and character are
primarily religious."26 If the "purpose" of the organization is "essentially
secular, or neutral as far as religion is concerned," the court will not grant
21. 483 U.S. 327, 340-46 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-i.
23. 483 U.S. at 342.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Townley Eng'g, 859 F.2d 61o, 618
(9 th Cir. 1988).
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the Section 702 exemption.27 The caselaw developed under Section 702
should apply to the RFRA defense as well: Only those employers considered
"religious" for purposes of Section 702 should be allowed to raise the RFRA
defense. Once raised, however, that defense should bar every discrimination
lawsuit.
III. How DOES THE RFRA DEFENSE DIFFER FROM THE "MINISTERIAL Ex-
CEPTION"?
In Tomic, 28 the Seventh Circuit belittled the RFRA defense as unneces-
sary because courts already grant religious institutions a "ministerial excep-
tion" to anti-discrimination laws.29 According to Tomic, the RFRA defense
requires more of a church than does the ministerial exception: The RFRA
requires the church to show that the lawsuit imposes a substantial burden
on its exercise of religion. Because the RFRA defense is more limited than
the ministerial exception, Tomic dismissed the defense as superfluous.
Tomic is mistaken. The RFRA defense is more than the ministerial ex-
ception's shadow. As shown above, the RFRA defense applies to all employ-
ees of religious institutions; the ministerial exception applies only to em-
ployees with religious duties.3" Employees with few religious duties don't
qualify.3
Moreover, the ministerial exception is limited to lawsuits involving dis-
putes over religious meaning. At least three circuits have explained the ex-
ception as a prohibition on courts becoming "entangled" in religious dis-
27. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kamehameha Schs., 990 F.2d
458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993).
28. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036,1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
29. See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 227 (6th Cir. 2007);
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F. 3d 294, 304-05 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting
cases from eight circuits and joining them).
30. The courts have been fairly generous in their understanding of what positions
involve religious duties. See, e.g., Tomic, 442 F.3d 1036 (a music director and
organist); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363
F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004) (supervisor of kosher foods); Alicea-Hernandez v.
Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F. 3d 698 (7 th Cir. 2003) ("Hispanic Communica-
tions Manager"); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Roman Catho-
lic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) (director of "music minis-
try" and part-time teacher); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999)
(choir director).
31. E.g., Demarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) (stressing
that the plaintiff, a lay teacher, had few religious duties that were "easily iso-
lated and defined"); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish
Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 1993) (same).
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putes.32 That entanglement would violate the Establishment Clause because
by deciding the case the court would lend its authority to one side of a reli-
gious debate.3 3 Because the RFRA defense is based on free exercise rather
than establishment concerns, it is not so limited. The RFRA defense bars
even those employment discrimination suits that don't threaten to entangle
a court in a dispute over religious meaning.
It makes sense to interpret the RFRA to give churches more protection
than the constitutionally based ministerial exception offers-indeed, that's
the only interpretation of the RFRA that makes sense of City of Boerne v.
Flores.34 Prior to City of Boerne, the Supreme Court had limited churches'
free exercise rights in Employment Division v. Smith,3 5 which held that the
First Amendment does not relieve churches of the burden of obeying neu-
tral, generally applicable laws.36 Congress meant to overturn Smith by pass-
ing the RFRA, which does exempt churches from such laws. Precisely be-
cause the RFRA grants more protection than the First Amendment, the
Court in City of Boerne held that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
authorize Congress to apply the RFRA to state laws. 7 Section 5, the Court
explained, only grants Congress the power to prevent states from violating
the Constitution, and Smith held that states don't violate the First Amend-
ment when they force churches to follow neutral laws.
The implication is clear: The RFRA defense must offer churches more
protection from the federal anti-discrimination laws than the First Amend-
32. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3 d
455, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185 (7th Cir. 1994); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Sev-
enth-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4 th Cir. 1985).
33. See, e.g., Catholic University, 83 F.3d at 465-66. The word "entanglement"
comes from the third prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, which determines
whether government action violates the Establishment Clause. 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971). But the Supreme Court's refusal to allow the nation's courts to
adjudicate religious disputes has much deeper roots. See Presbyterian Church
in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 449 (1969) ("[T] he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that
civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes."); Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) (holding that secular courts may not
review the religious reasoning of church courts).
34. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
35. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
36. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 ("Smith held that neutral, generally applica-
ble laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a
compelling government interest.").
37. Id. at 519-20.
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ment does. Tomic's contrary assertion can't be squared with City of Boerne.
If Tomic were right that the RFRA offers churches less protection than the
First Amendment, then Congress would have authority to apply the RFRA
to state laws, and City of Boerne would have come out the other way.
CONCLUSION
Hankins may be the first of many cases to consider how the RFRA de-
fense applies to discrimination lawsuits against church employers. Other
circuits should follow Hankins not only because of the majority's persuasive
textual analysis, but also because the Hankins result is a fair way to ensure
churches the autonomy over personnel decisions that is vital to their exer-
cise of religion.
